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Abstract
It is widely accepted that a child under the age of eighteen can donate his or her bone marrow to a sick sibling in the 
hope of saving their life. The Human Tissue Authority in the United Kingdom has published guidelines (currently under 
review) relating specifically to the harvest of blood and tissues from children, but the law has not yet confirmed the validity 
of such procedures. Younger donors require parental consent which can be highly subjective given the circumstances, 
and a Gillick consent from an older child is not confirmed in law as applicable to non-therapeutic medical procedures. This 
article suggests that the current child donation procedures under the Human Tissue Authority are not legally tenable and 
do not support the welfare of the child.
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Introduction
The creation of saviour siblings using fertility treatment is now 
possible in the United Kingdom as a result of the decision in Quintavalle 
v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and Secretary 
of State for Health) (2005) 2 A.C. 561. Lord Hoffman stated that the 
word ‘suitable’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1 (1) (d) of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was to be read subjectively 
according to the desires of the mother. The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 inserted the following passage into the 1990 Act 
as a result of the judgment:
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1ZA (1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an 
embryo, except for one or more of the following purposes:
(d) in a case where a person (‘the sibling’) who is the child of the 
persons whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the 
embryo (or of either of those persons) suffers from a serious medical 
condition which could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, 
bone marrow or other tissue of any resulting child, establishing 
whether the tissue of any resulting child would be compatible with that 
of the sibling.
The Lords in Quintavalle did not wish to address the wider ethical 
issues of creating babies for the purposes of harvesting bone marrow or 
whether the procedure would even be legal considering the young age 
of the donors. Lord Hoffman preferred to let the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority “grapple with such issues” at its discretion 
(per Lord Hoffman at paragraph 26). There is now a significant 
loophole in the law as a result of Quintavalle and the following 
questions require further investigation: what are the Human Tissue 
Authority guidelines on bone marrow donation from child donors 
and do they support the welfare of the child? How much importance 
is placed on parental consent in light of its unusual subjectivity? Is a 
psychological benefit required for a child donor and if so, how much 
awareness must the child have for it to manifest? Are measures in place 
to identify coercion? In the case of older donors could a Gillick consent 
qualify for a non-therapeutic medical procedure, and does the law in 
similar jurisdictions (e.g. the US) provide any guidance?
The Human Tissue Authority (HT Authority) forwarded statistics 
as part of this research and its history of child bone marrow donations 
states the following: (Table 1).
The constant “zero” in the cases rejected column suggests that the 
HT Authority is satisfied that its guidelines have been met in every single 
child donation case since 2007. The High Court has not yet confirmed 
the validity of bone marrow harvests on children in law, making these 
statistics curious. It is time to examine the HT Authority guidelines 
(which are due to be updated in 2016) to reveal whether the welfare of 
the child donor is supported throughout the donation process.
The human tissue authority guidelines
The Human Tissue Authority in the United Kingdom has published 
guidelines - Code of Practice 6: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow 
and Peripheral Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation (2014) - on the 
harvest of bone marrow from children and incompetent adults [1]. An 
adult donor is always preferable provided there is a suitable match. 
The law is fractured when it comes to donations from children. In 
regards to the storage and use of materials, the Human Tissue Act 2004 
allows a child to consent to the storage and use of his bone marrow 
under section 2(2) and a parent can consent on his behalf if he fails to 
consent or is unable to consent under section 2(3). These provisions 
are incorporated into the HT Authority guidelines. There is separate 
legislation in Scotland entitled the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 
where the different rules are detailed under section 17, but Scotland is 
outside the ambit of this article.
Year Child bone marrow/blood stem cell cases approved Cases rejected
2007 - 2008 71 0
2008 - 2009 57 0
2009 - 2010 78 0
2010 - 2011 67 0
2011 - 2012 68 0
2012 - 2013 69 0
2013 - 2014 78 0
Table 1: Statistics from the Human Tissue Authority (as of January 2015).
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D. Paragraph 82: A person with parental responsibility can consent 
to storage and use of bone marrow for transplantation on behalf of 
the child, if the donation is assessed as being in the child’s overall best 
interests, taking into account not only the medical but also emotional, 
psychological and social aspects of the donation, as well as the risks [1].
The key phrases used in paragraphs 28, 30, 31 and 82 include: 
‘reward’, ‘consent’, ‘interviews’, ‘communicating’, ‘overall best 
interests’ and ‘emotional, psychological and social aspects’. These paint 
a picture of wider familial interests where the benefit to the younger 
donor is spread thinly across the family unit. It is not clear whether 
this social approach is enough to validate a non-therapeutic medical 
procedure upon a child in law. 
Does the very young donor need awareness?
The HT Authority guidelines state that there must be interviews 
with the child donor as part of the approval process. This is to 
determine a benefit to the child as well as to reveal any evidence of 
coercion. However, the guidelines advise that the consenting parent is 
present during the interview.
A. Paragraph 60: The HT Authority advises that AA’s should 
interview younger child donors along with the person providing the 
consent on their behalf. 
B. Paragraph 83: It is good practice that the practitioners involved 
assess the donor child’s best interests by talking to the child and the 
person who has parental responsibility for them.
C. Paragraph 89: In some circumstances children may experience 
feelings of guilt or a fear that love may be withdrawn if they do not 
proceed with donation and these feelings could influence the child’s 
decision to donate. In trying to determine whether a child has been 
coerced into donating, it is important for the AA to discuss any feelings 
of pressure or duty the child holds and explore their origins.
Paragraph 60 may not be entirely fair. The guidelines list duress, 
coercion and rewards as concerns regarding young donors, but if the 
parent is present during the interview the child is far less likely to answer 
questions honestly (i.e. that mommy promised a trip to Disneyland, for 
example) for fear of reprisal. The guidelines do, however, acknowledge 
feelings of guilt or fear.
It is unlikely, if the parent is present, that any meaningful 
discussions with the child would occur. Adults find it difficult to be 
honest to colleagues and friends on a daily basis; it would be extra 
challenging for very young children with their parents present. This is 
frustrating because they are far more likely to be taken advantage of as a 
result of their inability to voice their discontent. The Children Act 1989 
clearly states under section 1.
Children Act 1989: Section 1: Welfare of the child: (1) When a 
court determines any question with respect to:
a) the upbringing of a child; or
b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of 
any income from it, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration.
(2) A court shall have regard in particular to:
a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned 
(considered in the light of his age and understanding);
b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;
The removal of bone marrow requires a trespass to the child and 
is covered by common law. A parental consent is usually sufficient for 
regular medical treatment because of the inherent therapeutic benefit 
(e.g. immunisations), but consent is not enough to validate an invasive 
trespass (e.g. a bone marrow harvest) if there is no therapeutic benefit 
whatsoever (R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 per Lord Jauncey and Lord 
Mustill). Therefore, the role of the HT Authority is to approve the bone 
marrow harvest as being in the best interests of the child by the powers 
invested in it under the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the Human Tissue 
(Quality and Safety for Human Application) Regulations.
In cases requiring approval (i.e. all non-competent children), the 
clinician responsible for the donor must make a written referral to 
the HT Authority via an Accredited Assessor (AA). The AA conducts 
interviews with the donor, the person giving consent on behalf of the 
donor and the recipient, and then submits a report of the assessment 
to the HT Authority. The AA must state whether the relevant 
requirements of the Human Tissue Act 2004 have been met. The HT 
Authority then makes a final decision. In an examination of how these 
approval procedures align with the welfare of the child, this article will 
split child donors into three groups: 
i. very young donors;
ii. young donors with enough awareness to refuse; and 
iii. Gillick-competent donors.
Very young donor
A child who is too young to consent to medical treatment that is 
in his best interests can refer a parent or guardian to consent on his 
behalf. A bone marrow harvest presents a new legal quandary: it has no 
physical benefit in donors of any age and it has no psychological benefit 
in very young donors. The approval process is described in plain terms 
in the HT Authority guidelines:
A. Paragraph 28: Before the HT Authority can approve such cases, 
the HT Authority must be satisfied that:
1. no reward has been, or is to be, given;
2. consent to removal for the purpose of transplantation has been 
given;
3. an AA has conducted separate interviews with the donor, the 
person giving consent, and the recipient and submitted a report of their 
assessment to the HT Authority.
B. Paragraph 30: Matters to be covered for every interview:
1. evidence of duress or coercion;
2. evidence of an offer of a reward;
3. difficulties in communicating.
C. Paragraph 31: In addition for interviews with the donor and 
parent:
1. information given as to the nature of the medical procedure and 
the risks involved;
2. the name of the person who gave that information to the (parent) 
and their qualification to give it;
3. the capacity of the person interviewed to understand the nature 
of the medical procedure and the risk involved and that consent may be 
withdrawn at any time before the removal.
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c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of which the 
court considers relevant;
e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation 
to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his needs.
It is not in any child’s interests to be coerced, manipulated, 
prodded or manoeuvred into a non-therapeutic medical procedure. 
The High Court in the United Kingdom has not ruled on the issue of 
child donation yet but it is highly unlikely that the welfare test will be 
used as a mechanism to enforce a bone marrow harvest upon a child 
who is showing signs of duress. Crouch and Elliott agree that altruism 
is not a characteristic associated with young children:
“…if the donor is not mentally developed to a sufficient degree, he 
will not only fail to understand why he is in the hospital and why he has 
been physically harmed, he will also fail to understand the important 
role that he has played in the care of his sibling. Thus he may well not 
receive any psychological benefits as a result of his donation” [2].
A definitive passage by Wilson J in Re C (A Child) (HIV Test) 
(2000) Fam. 48 made it very clear that parents have no legal right to 
manipulate, coerce or subsume the rights of their child into their own:
“This case is not at its heart about the rights of the parents. And if, 
as he in effect suggested in his evidence, the father regards the rights of 
a tiny baby as subsumed within the rights of the parents, he is wrong. 
This baby has rights of her own. They can be considered nationally or 
internationally. Under our national law I must determine the case by 
reference to her welfare.”
It would clearly not be appropriate for a parent to use his child 
to meet his own interests when the child has separate national and 
international rights, but the HT Authority guidelines do not appear to 
support the autonomy of the child. If anything, by requesting the parent 
to stay with the donor child during the interview the HT Authority is 
encouraging the subjugation of the child’s voice (if he is old enough to 
have one) into the voice of the parent, who is no doubt very supportive 
of the harvest. 
AAs are encouraged to raise concerns about coercion in their report 
to the HT Authority and a donor, a recipient, a person acting on behalf 
of either or a medical practitioner can ask for a review, but judging by 
the statistics (further above) there must have been very few concerns 
raised because no cases of child donation have yet been rejected since 
records began in 2007. 
A related issue in this section is communication. The ability of the 
young donor to communicate his thoughts on donation is a significant 
barrier to proving a psychological benefit and the younger he is, the 
less likely he is to be aware of the plight of the older sibling. The HT 
Authority guidelines have advised on this issue:
A. Paragraph 70: The level of communication required for child 
donors depends on the child’s ability to understand the donation 
procedure.
B. Paragraph 71: Where children are able to understand the 
donation procedure and give consent, the information should be 
explained in terms that they find easy to understand - with help from 
appropriately qualified staff, as required.
C. Paragraph 72: Even small children can be helped to 
understand some aspects of the procedure and its associated risks. 
This understanding can be assisted by involving a play therapist, 
psychologist or specialist nurse in the communication process so that 
the child can gain a better understanding of what the donation would 
involve.
Paragraph 72 is a cause for concern. A child who requires a play 
therapist, a psychologist or a specialist nurse to understand the basics of 
a bone marrow harvest is probably too young to glean a psychological 
benefit from the procedure. The suggestion that he would simply 
benefit from “having a sibling for company” or “having a complete 
family around her” is not enough, as per Calvo J in the leading U.S. 
saviour sibling case of Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319:
The psychological benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the 
donor and recipient are known to each other as family. Only where 
there is an existing relationship between a healthy child and his or 
her ill sister or brother may a psychological benefit to the child from 
donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist…it is 
not in the best interest of either Allison or James (the twins) to undergo 
the proposed bone marrow harvesting procedure…it is not possible 
to discover the child’s likely treatment/non-treatment preferences by 
examining the child’s philosophical, religious and moral views, life 
goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, 
and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and 
death…at the age of three and a half, it is very difficult if not impossible 
to predict what a specific individual will do in a specific circumstance 
at a specific point of time in the future.
The judgment in Curran underpinned our very own saviour sibling 
case of Re Y (1997) Fam. 110 (examined below), making it a highly 
influential authority. Other cases on welfare and medical procedures 
have also pointed to a fundamental connection between awareness and 
best interests:
1. U.S. common law:
i. Strunk v Strunk (1969) 445 S. W. 2d 145 Ky.: “Jerry (is) greatly 
dependant on Tommy, emotionally and psychologically, and his well-
being would be jeopardised more severely by the loss of his brother 
than by the removal of a kidney” and “he identifies with his brother”.
ii. Hart v Brown (1972) 289 A. 2d 386, Conn. Super Ct.: “(Margaret 
Hart) desired to donate her kidney so that her sister may return to her”, 
“strong identification with her twin sister” and “it would be a very great 
loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her illness”.
iii. Little v Little (1979) 576 S. W. 2d 493 Tex.: “existence of a close 
relationship between Anne and Stephen, a genuine concern by each 
for the welfare of the other” and “awareness by Anne of the nature of 
Stephen’s plight and an awareness of the fact that she is in a position to 
ameliorate Stephen’s burden”.
2. U.K. common law:
i. Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) (1988) A.C. 199: the 
primary question is one of “welfare and benefit”.
ii. Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) (1990) 2 A.C. 1: treatment 
must “save lives, ensure improvement or prevent deterioration” 
inferring an actual benefit.
iii. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) A.C. 789: “the treatment is 
of no benefit to him because he is totally unconscious”.
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iv. Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) (1997) Fam. 
110: adult donor had an “emotional, psychological and social benefit”.
v. An NHS Trust v MB (2006) EWHC 507: a balance sheet of actual 
benefits and burdens helps the judge to objectively deliberate welfare.
In particular is the case of Re A (Male Sterilisation) (2000) 1 F.L.R. 
549 where Butler-Sloss L.J. stated that a benefit must be proved:
“In my judgment best interests encompasses medical, emotional 
and all other welfare issues…An operation to sterilise has to be 
demonstrated to be in the best interests of the person unable to 
consent.” 
The case has to be proved.
The HT Authority guidelines do not place a very strong emphasis 
on awareness (they do not, for example, limit donation to older 
children or provide a list of suitable psychiatric benefits). This is a 
concern because the law clearly states that the benefit has to be proved, 
and a psychiatric benefit in a child donor can only be proved if he had 
awareness of that benefit. In conclusion, a very young donor cannot 
glean a psychological benefit from the harvest. This view is supported 
in [3-7].
How authoritive is parental consent?
The HT Authority places a great deal of weight behind parental 
consent in its donation guidelines. This stems in part from section 2 
of the Human Tissue Act 2004 which allows a parent to consent to the 
storage and use of a child’s bone marrow if the child cannot consent or 
fails to reach a decision on consent. The guidelines translate the law as 
follows:
A. Paragraph 64: The giving of consent is a positive act. For consent 
to be valid, it must be given voluntarily, by an appropriately informed 
person who has the capacity to agree to the activity in question.
B. Paragraph 65: In cases where donors are unable to give consent 
themselves, i.e. children who are not competent to consent, the decision 
about consent will be made by a person acting on their behalf. In these 
cases HTA approval will be required.
C. Paragraph 68: Donation is an entirely voluntary act and the 
donor (and where applicable the person consenting on their behalf) 
must be free of any kind of coercion or pressure.
D. Paragraph 81: A person who has parental responsibility can 
consent to the storage and use of bone marrow for transplantation on 
the child’s behalf if there is no decision by the child either to, or not to, 
consent, and:
1. the child is not competent to deal with the issue of consent to 
donation for transplantation.
Paragraph 82: The consent of only one person with parental 
responsibility is necessary.
Paragraph 83: It is good practice that the practitioners involved 
assess the donor child’s best interests by talking to the child and the 
person who has parental responsibility for them.
These guidelines are disappointing. Consent is described as a 
‘positive’ and ‘voluntary’ act by an ‘appropriately informed person’ 
with ‘the capacity to agree’ under paragraph 64. This should be the 
case for every bone marrow donor in light of the non-therapeutic 
nature of the procedure, but it only serves to highlight that a newly 
born or toddling donor cannot meet any of these criteria and his parent 
effectively substitutes his lack of capacity in order to push the harvest 
forward. Paragraph 68 requires the consenting parent to be ‘free from 
coercion or pressure’, but this must turn a blind eye to the situation 
at home where the other sibling is morbidly ill and in need of a life-
saving bone marrow donation. Paragraph 82 requires only one parent 
to consent, but it is unlikely that the second parent would disagree if 
their child is facing death in the near future. Finally, paragraph 83 is 
particularly unsatisfactory in that it incorporates the opinions of third 
parties (the parents) into the assessment process. The autonomy of the 
very young donor is not supported here if the parent is in a desperate 
predicament.
It appears, as far as the HT Authority guidelines are concerned, 
that parents can substitute the silence of the donor child with a positive, 
voluntary and informed consent on his behalf (subject to approval). 
This consent would be highly subjective because of the situation at 
home.
Fortunately, the common law has grappled with parental consent 
in controversial cases and readily disposed of it when the best interests 
of the child are not supported. The law is quite settled on this point, 
even in medical cases where the facts are grave. 
S v M (1970) 1 W.L.R. 672 was the first modern case to move away 
from the old notion that parents always know best for their child, per 
Sachs L.J.:
“…the parens patriae jurisdiction is one for the benefit and 
protection - I emphasis the words ‘and protection’ - of the infant; 
and that it…can be something very different from the self-centred 
interests that adults may have in sorting out their own affairs…upon 
the authorities that I have seen to date, one should look at what are the 
paramount interests of the child: other interests are subordinate unless 
they either coincide with them or unless there is some exceptional 
reason for giving effect to them.”
The phrase ‘self-centred interests’ is intriguing - could the parents 
of saviour siblings be securing their own interests when presenting 
their child for harvest? To put it another way, would they consent to 
the harvest and its inherent risks if they had never met the sick child 
(i.e. he was adopted at birth)? 
The first modern medical case to expressly reject the views of the 
parents was Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1981) 1 
W.L.R. 1421: 
“While great weight ought to be given to the views of the parents 
they are not views which necessarily must prevail…Fortunately or 
unfortunately, in this particular case the decision no longer lies with 
the parents or with the doctors, but lies with the court…The judge was 
much affected by the reasons given by the parents and came to the 
conclusion that their wishes ought to be respected. In my judgment 
he erred in that the duty of the court is to decide whether it is in the 
interests of the child that an operation should take place… (the court) 
cannot hide behind the decision of the parents or the decision of the 
doctors; and in making the decision this court’s first and paramount 
consideration is the welfare of this unhappy little baby.”
The common law continued to travel in this direction with the 
following high profile cases:
a) Re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) (1988) A.C. 
806: “When the jurisdiction of the court is invoked for the protection of 
the child the parental privileges…become immediately subservient to 
the paramount consideration which the court always has in mind, that 
is to say, the welfare of the child.”
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b) Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) (1990) 2 AC 1: “(court) 
guidance should be sought in order to obtain an independent, objective 
and authoritive view on the lawfulness of the procedure.”
c) Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1991) Fam. 
33: “the court adopts the standpoint of the reasonable and responsible 
parent who had his or her child’s best interests at heart.”
d) Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1992) 2 FCR 
219: “I regret that I find it essential for his well-being to protect him 
from himself and his parents, and so I override his and his parents’ 
decision.”
e) Re Z (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) (1997) Fam. 
1: “the role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective 
judgment. If that judgment is in accord with that of the devoted and 
responsible parent, well and good. If it is not, then it is the duty of the 
court to give effect to its own judgment.”
f) Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1997) 1 W.L.R. 
242: “paramountancy will compel the court to substitute the judge’s 
own views over those of natural parents - even in a case where the views 
of the latter are supported by qualities of devotion, commitment, love 
and reason.”
The most recent notable case on the best interests of children is 
Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust (2005) EWCA Civ 1811 in 
which the wishes of the parents were described as “wholly irrelevant”:
(i) …it is the role and duty of the court to…exercise its own 
independent and objective judgment;
(iv) The matter must be decided by the application of an objective 
approach or test;
(v) That test is the best interests of the patient. Best interests are used 
in the widest sense and include every kind of consideration capable of 
impacting on the decision. These include, non-exhaustively, medical, 
emotional, sensory (pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the 
human instinct to survive) considerations;
(x) The views and opinions of both the doctors and the parents 
must be carefully considered. Where the parents spend a great deal of 
time with their child, their views may have particular value because 
they know the patient…although the court needs to be mindful that 
the views of any parents may, very understandably, be coloured 
by their own emotion or sentiment…Their own wishes, however 
understandable in human terms, are wholly irrelevant to consideration 
of the objective best interests of the child.
The case law above draws a very strong picture of objectivity. The 
High Court plays the role of the reasonable parent in difficult medical 
cases and the consent of the parents is not decisive no matter how 
grave the circumstances are (as stated in: Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) (1991) Fam. 33 per Balcombe L.J.; Re E (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1992) 2 FCR 219 per Ward J and Re 
Z (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) (1997) Fam. 1 per Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR). The wishes of the parents to either be included 
in deliberations of welfare, to subsume the rights of their child into their 
own or to instil their own altruistic ideals into their child are rejected in 
favour of the welfare of the child under Section 1(3) of the Children Act 
1989. It is often disappointing for parents to learn that their views have 
no influence but if, in a child bone marrow donation case, the judge 
found it to be in his best interests to donate bone marrow to her older 
sibling, the decision would have had nothing to do with his parents. 
Judges can choose to listen to and consider their views, but nothing 
more. This occurred in the US in Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 
1319, but the idea of an “open future” for children dates back to 1891 in 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v Botsford (1891) 141 U.S. 250:
“…no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession 
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
The US courts have since recognised that children have a “legal 
right to begin life with a sound mind and body” as in Stallman v 
Youngquist (1988) 531 N.E.2d 355 (Illinois Supreme Court) at page 
360, supporting the idea that they are independent legal entities with 
their own rights. Turning back to the HT Authority guidelines, it now 
seems inappropriate that a parent should give a positive, voluntary 
and informed consent on the child’s behalf to a non-therapeutic 
medical procedure. It is substituted altruism. The donor cannot 
be interviewed separately because not only is he too young but the 
guidelines encourage parents to be present (paragraphs 60 and 83). 
This does not support the welfare of the child because he is unable to be 
considered as an autonomous person in his own right. In conclusion, 
his paramountancy is lost.
What are social interests?
The approval process of the HT Authority is summed up in one 
paragraph and it is of particular interest:
A. Paragraph 82: A person with parental responsibility can consent 
to storage and use of bone marrow for transplantation on behalf of 
the child, if the donation is assessed as being in the child’s overall best 
interests, taking into account not only the medical but also emotional, 
psychological and social aspects of the donation, as well as the risks 
(emphasis added) [1].
Parents have the power to consent to the storage and use of bone 
marrow under the Human Tissue Act 2004 (section 2), but the removal 
of bone marrow has to be approved by the HT Authority using the 
conditions set out in paragraph 82. These should align with the statute 
and common law of welfare because a non-therapeutic removal of bone 
marrow must be shown to support the welfare of the child before it can 
be carried out. A reminder of the welfare test reveals a strong alignment 
to paragraph 82:
Children Act 1989
Section 1: Welfare of the child.
(3) A court shall have regard in particular to:
a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned 
(considered in the light of his age and understanding);
b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;
c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of which the 
court considers relevant;
e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation 
to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his needs.
It is notable, however, that the term ‘social’ does not feature in the 
welfare test under the 1989 Act. ‘Social’ alludes to wider familial benefits 
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and this was rejected by the common law in Re A (Male Sterilisation) 
(2000) 1 F.L.R. 549 by Butler-Sloss L.J. who wanted to focus on the 
other needs of the patient: 
“…in my judgment best interests encompasses medical, emotional 
and all other welfare issues…social reasons for carrying out of non-
therapeutic invasive surgery is not part of the present state of the 
law…An operation to sterilise has to be demonstrated to be in the best 
interests of the person unable to consent.” 
A bone marrow harvest could be described as a social procedure in 
that it is carried out for the emotional benefit of the wider family, but it 
is clear according to Butler-Sloss L.J. that it is not appropriate to ponder 
social reasons when deliberating the welfare of an incompetent patient. 
So where did the ‘social’ element come from in the HT Authority 
donation guidelines? The leading (and only) case on saviour siblings in 
the United Kingdom is Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) 
(1997) Fam. 110. The donor (aged 25) was severely handicapped and 
lived in a community care home. Her older sister (aged 36) suffered 
from myelodispastic syndrome and the donor was a good match. The 
legal quandary was described by Connell J: 
“the taking of blood tests and the harvesting of bone marrow 
from the (donor), who is incapable of giving informed consent, would 
amount to assaults upon the (donor) and would therefore be illegal 
unless shown to be in the best interests of the (donor) and therefore 
lawful.” 
Connell J decided, despite the lack of awareness on the donor’s 
part, to authorise the bone marrow harvest on the grounds that the 
connection between the mother and sick sister was strong enough to 
emotionally and socially benefit the donor:
“In this situation, the (donor) would clearly be harmed by the 
reduction in or loss of contact with her mother. Accordingly, it is to the 
benefit of the (donor) that she should act as donor to her sister because 
in this way her positive relationship with her mother is most likely to 
be prolonged. Further, if the transplant occurs, this is likely to improve 
the (donor’s) relationship with her mother who in her heart clearly 
wishes it to take place and also to improve her relationship with the 
plaintiff who will be eternally grateful to her…it is relevant to ask the 
question, why subject the (donor) to this process? To this the answer, 
in my judgment…is because it is to her emotional, psychological and 
social benefit.”
The judgment in Re Y (1997) is difficult to reconcile with the 
common principles of welfare law. While it is accepted that there is 
not a paramountancy test for incompetent adults (the best interests 
test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 section 4(6) didn’t exist at 
the time), there is still a need to ensure that the welfare of the donor 
is placed above third parties. Connell J made it clear that the plight of 
the mother (who was very unwell) and the sick sibling played a large 
role in his decision to authorise the harvest. This is the interfamilial 
principle, which places the needs of the wider family into the same 
melting pot as those of the patient/donor/ward. It clashes with the 
notion of paramountancy. Children are protected by a much stricter 
welfare test under the Children Act 1989, but the HT Authority seems 
to be unaware of this according to its 2014 guidelines:
Paragraph 82: …taking into account not only the medical but also 
emotional, psychological and social aspects of the donation, as well as 
the risks.
If social aspects were rejected in an incompetent adult case (Re A), 
they are highly unlikely to feature in a stricter welfare test for children. 
Paragraph 82 may need to be urgently addressed - social aspects 
should not authorise a non-therapeutic medical procedure upon a 
child. In conclusion, wider familial interests should play no part in the 
deliberation of the best interests of the very young donor.
As a side line, distressed parents who attempt to justify a bone 
marrow harvest upon their newly born or toddling child by instigating 
a balancing act between the siblings may be told by the High Court that 
it is not appropriate. This is another social approach in determining the 
welfare of the child and it was rejected in Re X (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Jurisdiction) (1975) Fam. 47:
“It would be quite impossible to protect award against everything 
which might do her harm. In particular, the jurisdiction must be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of outside parties whether such 
rights arise at common law or by contract or otherwise. By “outside 
parties” I mean those not in a family or personal relation to the ward.”
In fact, only if the siblings are warded together is it appropriate to 
balance the burden to one against the plight of another (it has been 
confirmed in common law that the welfare of siblings can only be 
offset if they are both warded in the same case at the same time: Court 
of Appeal (1993) 1 FLR 883 per Balcombe LJ, and Birmingham City 
Council v H (A Minor) (1994) 2 AC 212 per Lord Slynn.
In summary of very young donors, the HT Authority donation 
guidelines place a heavy emphasis on parental consent, do not require 
full awareness from the donor, are not clear on psychological benefits, 
do not support the paramountancy of the child, and include social 
aspects in deliberations of welfare despite the common law advising 
not to. This is disappointing. It may have too much discretion and not 
enough legal precedent to help construct a more rigorous approval 
process.
Older child donors
Older children who have not acquired Gillick competence but 
can communicate effectively and can glean a psychological benefit 
(i.e. perhaps between the ages of 4 - 12) have an even more interesting 
position in law. If they understand the procedure and consent to the 
procedure there is simply the question of a psychological benefit to 
resolve (the approval process detailed above will be applied). If they 
understand the procedure and refuse the procedure, there is no avenue 
left for the HT Authority to pursue. The statute law for storage and use 
of materials only allows parents to consent on the child’s behalf if the 
child fails to reach a decision:
Human Tissue Act 2004
Section 2: Appropriate Consent: Children
(3) Where:
a) the child concerned is alive;
b) neither a decision of his to consent to the activity, nor a decision 
of his not to consent to it, is in force, and
c) either he is not competent to deal with the issue of consent in 
relation to the activity or, though he is competent to deal with that 
issue, he fails to do so, 
‘appropriate consent’ means the consent of a person who has 
parental responsibility for him.
This is transferred into the HT Authority guidelines:
A. Paragraph 81: A person who has parental responsibility can 
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consent to the storage and use of bone marrow for transplantation on 
the child’s behalf if there is no decision by the child either to, or not to, 
consent, and:
1. the child is not competent to deal with the issue of consent to 
donation for transplantation (i.e. non-Gillick competent).
The common law on removal of materials arrives at the same point: 
a refusal to harvest bone marrow would mean there is no psychological 
benefit to the child. In fact, there would be clear psychological burdens 
such as fear of operations, fear of losing a body part, spite, resentment, 
force, manipulation, exploitation, guilt, rejection and fear of being 
treated as an insurance policy, not to mention the physical risks such 
as bone fracture, bone infection, rupture of an artery, skin scarring, 
hypertension, anaemia, broken needles, blood transfusion and pain [4, 
8-12]. Life threatening risks that have been reported in real cases include 
non-fatal cardiac arrest, pulmonary embolus, aspiration pneumonitis, 
ventricular tachycardia and cerebral infarction (connected to the 
general anaesthetic) [13]. The result, it would seem, is the end of 
the road for the HT Authority, which is unable to authorise a non-
therapeutic medical procedure on a child unless it is found to be in 
his psychological interests. The HT Authority has taken account of this 
scenario and has suggested the jurisdiction of the High Court:
B. Paragraph 107: Where a child is a potential bone marrow donor 
and not competent to consent, a person with parental responsibility can 
consent to donation on behalf of the child if the donation is assessed 
as being in the child’s overall best interests. However, where there is a 
dispute between persons with parental responsibility, or between them 
and the clinicians looking after the child, or there is a doubt as to best 
interests, the court should be asked to rule in advance.
C. Paragraph 108: In such cases, a court declaration on best interests 
should be in place before the case is referred to the HT Authority for a 
decision on approval for the donation to proceed.
Paragraph 107 provides the triggers for court intervention: 
i. a dispute between parents; 
ii. a dispute between parents and clinicians; 
iii. a general doubt as to best interests. 
An older child who has not yet reached Gillick competence but 
refuses the harvest would probably fall under category (iii). The High 
Court in the UK, using its inherent jurisdiction, would finally get to 
apply the welfare test under section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The 
law of welfare in a medical context has already been examined (above) 
and it is clear that the welfare of the donor child would be paramount. 
It is also clear that he must have awareness of a psychological benefit, 
parental consent is not decisive, substituted altruism is not acceptable, 
social aspects are not to be included in deliberations of welfare, and the 
discomfort to the donor child is not to be placed in a balancing exercise 
against the sick sibling. The primary concern of the High Court should 
a saviour sibling case arrive on its doorstep is the welfare of the donor. 
The HT Authority guidelines confirm that should the donor 
child become a ward of court the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 SI 
1247 ensure that a family lawyer at the Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) is involved. A guardian 
ad litem (litigation friend) will also be appointed by the court for 
the child to ensure independent representation and to safeguard the 
interests of the donor child. In these circumstances the guardian will 
almost certainly be a member of staff at CAFCASS. It is worth noting a 
concern, however, that the independent guardian may have a family of 
her own and be highly sympathetic towards the plight of the parents. 
The AA is also based in the bone marrow transplant unit within the 
relevant hospital, incorporating a further element of subjectivity into 
the approval process.
In summary of older child donors, the lack of case law so far 
suggests a few possibilities: 
a) babies and toddlers have been accepted for harvest despite it 
being very difficult to prove a psychological benefit and despite their 
inability to effectively communicate how they feel about the procedure; 
b) children who are not old enough to be deemed Gillick competent 
are found to be free of duress or coercion despite their parents being 
present in interviews with the Accredited Assessor; 
c) any children who have refused the procedure have been 
overridden with parental consent despite no legal provision allowing 
the parents or the HT Authority to do so; or 
d) the social aspects of donation are still considered by the HT 
Authority even though ‘social reasons’ to carry out non-therapeutic 
medical procedures are specifically excluded from the deliberation of 
welfare under common law (Re A). 
What is most disappointing, above everything else, is that only in 
the event of a disagreement is High Court guidance sought and the 
welfare test under the Children Act 1989 applied. The welfare test and 
its associated case law should, it is submitted, be applied to every single 
case of non-competent child donation to ensure the welfare of the child.
Gillick-Competent donors
A Gillick-competent child can consent as an adult donor without a 
rigorous approval process. Lord Scarman in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986) AC 112 stated: 
“…the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child 
below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when 
the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable 
him or her to understand fully what is proposed…it is not enough that 
she should understand the nature of the advice which is being given: she 
must also have a sufficient maturity to understand what is involved.” 
An older child donor can therefore consent to the removal of her 
bone marrow (and its storage and use) if he has sufficient intelligence 
and maturity to understand the harvest, storage and use of his materials. 
The Human Tissue Act 2004 includes a provision on consent:
Section 2: Appropriate consent: children
(2) Where the child concerned is alive, ‘appropriate consent’ means 
his consent.
The HT Authority has incorporated the law into its donation 
guidelines as follows:
A. Paragraph 26: Under the HT Act 2004 and the HT Act (Persons 
who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 
donation of bone marrow both by adults with capacity and children 
competent to give consent may be approved locally.
B. Paragraph 75: The assessment of ‘competence’ of the potential 
child donor should be determined by the bone marrow transplant unit. 
Children competent to give consent are considered ‘Gillick-competent’.
C. Paragraph 78: Even if the child is competent to consent, it is 
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good practice to consult the person who has parental responsibility and 
to involve them in the child’s decision-making about whether to donate 
bone marrow for transplantation. However, it should be emphasised 
that if the child is competent the decision to consent must be theirs.
D. Paragraph 79: It is also essential to make sure that a child has 
consented voluntarily and has not been unduly influenced by anyone 
else: where older children are the donors, matters should be discussed 
with them first, where possible in the absence of the person with 
parental responsibility.
E. Paragraph 81: A person who has parental responsibility can 
consent to the storage and use of bone marrow for transplantation on 
the child’s behalf if there is no decision by the child either to, or not to, 
consent, and:
2. even though the child is competent to do so (i.e. Gillick 
competent), they have not made a decision about consent to donation 
for transplantation.
These guidelines are difficult to understand. Firstly, paragraph 
26 confirms that Gillick-competent children can be approved locally 
without the need for a rigorous approval process. This is a cause for 
concern. It is open to debate whether a child donor is Gillick competent 
or not, and it is unsettling that older children can be harvested without 
the same rigorous approval process as younger children (an interview to 
identify coercion, for example). Simply because the older child consents 
to the harvest and the transplant unit deem him to be competent it does 
not mean that he is not vulnerable to coercion or emotional blackmail. 
If anything, older children may be better able to hide the pressure they 
feel from family members, agreeing to the harvest for fear of reprisal. It 
is worth noting that incompetent adult donors, in comparison, always 
require court approval before the HT Authority can even consider the 
donation (this is confirmed in paragraph 36 of the donation guidelines 
and by Connell J in Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) 
(1997) Fam. 110. The reason for this discrepancy is not explained.
Secondly, paragraph 75 states that Gillick competence is 
determined by the bone marrow transplant unit but it is not clear what 
experience it has of determining the competence of children. It is also 
a subjective assessor in that it harvests the bone marrow. An older 
child would know this and may find it impossible to be open about her 
feelings. Thirdly, paragraphs 78 and 79 are slightly contradictory: it is 
recommended that the person with parental responsibility should be 
involved in the child’s decision to harvest, yet it is stated that the child 
should be interviewed on his own to avoid being unduly influenced by 
anyone else. A parent who is facing the death of his sick child could 
exert a huge influence on a teenage donor, so if the Gillick-competent 
child is to be treated as an adult in law then perhaps the parent(s) 
should not be involved? Paragraphs 78 and 79 also make the point that 
the decision to harvest must be voluntary and must come from the 
child, but these elements do not necessarily prove Gillick competence. 
Finally, paragraph 81 confirms that parents have the right to consent 
on behalf of their Gillick-competent child if he has not made a decision 
about donation. Therefore, should the competent child issue a refusal, 
the parents do not have the legal authority to override it.
It is worth noting that Gillick refusals have been rejected in 
common law for therapeutic medical procedures. Teenagers have 
refused life-saving medical treatment in the past and the High Court 
has overruled them for their own good. This occurred in:
a) Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) (1992) Fam. 
11 (CA);
b) Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1993) 1 FLR 
386 [14];
c) Re S (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1994) 2 FLR 
1065;
d) Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competence) (1998) 2 FLR 
810 [15];
e) Re P (A Child) (2003) EWHC 2327.
However, a bone marrow harvest can be distinguished from these 
cases on four grounds:
(i) there is no therapeutic benefit to a bone marrow donation;
(ii) its validity in law is not yet confirmed;
(iii) the Human Tissue Act 2004 does not give a parent the 
authority to consent over a refusal, and 
(iv) a psychological benefit would not be present in the child if he 
refused the procedure. There is no altruistic joy, only resentment and 
anger. 
Therefore, should a competent child refuse the harvest the case 
should go to High Court under paragraph 107 of the HT Authority 
guidelines. This has not occurred yet. In summary of Gillick-competent 
donors, they can be just as vulnerable as other child donors and the 
legitimacy of their consent to such a procedure is not yet confirmed 
in UK law.
Conclusion
The donation guidelines published by the HT Authority are not 
convincing in their efforts to protect the interests of the donor child. 
Very young donors have numerous legal requirements including 
awareness for a psychological benefit to manifest, paramountancy in a 
national and international context and the obligation that social aspects 
be removed from the deliberation of welfare. These are not provided for 
in the current donation guidelines. Ideally, older donors (both non-
competent and Gillick-competent) should be taken to the High Court 
in the event that they strongly oppose the donation, but no cases have 
been rejected since records began in 2007. It is also worth noting that 
there is no record of Gillick-competence ever being applied to a non-
therapeutic medical procedure. It is effectively a child consenting to 
serious harm for no good reason and this idea was outlawed in R v 
Brown (1994) 1 AC 212.
It is also a particular concern that bone marrow harvests on very 
young children can be approved despite: parents being present in 
interviews for coercion; very young donors requiring play therapists 
just to communicate properly; Gillick-competence being taken at face 
value with no approval process; the Accredited Assessor working in 
the relevant bone marrow transplant unit, and the High Court being 
referred to by the HT Authority only when there is a disagreement as to 
the best interests of the child. Paramountancy is lost, and the evidence 
is stronger than ever that the donor child is being used as a commodity. 
The old argument that the discomfort of the saviour child should be 
balanced against the plight of the sick child is proven as unacceptable 
in law.
In light of the fact that a bone marrow harvest on a child (of any 
age) has never been approved by the High Court in the UK it is surely 
wise to refer to the welfare test (and its accompanying common law) 
under s.1 of the Children Act 1989 for every case of child donation. 
This would ensure that the paramountancy of the child is restored. The 
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donation guidelines are due to be updated by 2016, and it is hoped that 
the focus will be shifted back onto the welfare of the donor.
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